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SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE LIMITATIONS OF NARRATIVE
by Jeanette Bicknell
In this passage from his Confessions, St. Augustine recounts someyouthful shenanigans: “In a garden nearby to our vineyard there was
a pear tree. . . . Late one night—to which hour, according to our
pestilential custom, we had kept up our street games, a group of very
bad youngsters set out to shake down and rob this tree. We took great
loads of fruit from it, not for our own eating, but rather to throw it to
the pigs . . . . Foul was the evil, and I loved it . . . I loved my fault itself.
Base in soul was I . . . .”1
Here a mature Augustine looks back on his boyhood self with
recrimination and reproach. Stealing pears is not seen as an immature
prank but as evidence of a base soul. Yet for all the force and gravity of
his words, it is not difficult to imagine a younger Augustine, before his
conversion to Christianity, light-heartedly reminiscing with friends
about these very same incidents. Of these two stories—the one he tells
in the Confessions and the one he might have told—which provides a
more accurate portrayal of Augustine’s boyhood soul? Which is closer
to the truth?
Narrative and personal identity would seem to be inextricably
bound.2 Telling stories or imposing a narrative coherence on events is
one of the main ways in which we make sense of our experience. We
also get to know others by listening to their stories, thus learning the
narrative coherence they have placed on events in their own lives. Over
the course of a lifetime stories may change. Characters first dismissed as
“bit players” may gain importance. Gestures or words earlier thought to
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be unimportant may, in retrospect, take on greater significance. With
time and reflection one’s past may be re-interpreted as displaying error,
alienation or ignorance. A cataclysmic religious conversion is only one
of many factors which might prompt such reflection and reinterpreta-
tion. Illness, divorce, and the death of loved ones are other possible
causes.
Here is my worry: presumably we would like to believe that our “new”
stories are improvements on the old, and that they reflect greater self-
knowledge, possibly even greater moral awareness. Yet given that any
number of possible narratives can make sense of a set of events, how
can we determine that any one story or way of understanding the past is
better than any other? How are we to distinguish those stories which
reflect greater understanding from those which are simply re-descriptions
or re-interpretations without greater insight on the part of the indi-
vidual? We may disagree about particular cases; those with a religious
world view are likely to believe that, post-conversion, Augustine is
telling the “right” story about the pear theft. However most would
concede that some ways of understanding the world are simply less
adequate than others—“less adequate” both in the sense of “less
reflective of the truth” and “less conducive to good relations with
others.” Few would defend the worldview of the inveterate racist, for
example. The problem of determining whether a story reflects greater
understanding and self-understanding is all the more challenging if we
take seriously the view that narrative structure is the organizing
principle, not only of experiences and actions, but of the very self that
experiences and acts.3 How radically must one’s personal narratives
change before her very identity has also changed?
Concerns about the epistemological status of personal narratives
bring us up against the limitations of narrative as a tool for understand-
ing persons. Given the under-determination of narrative by events,
listening to a person’s stories will not be enough to understand her. In
this paper I do two things. First, I illustrate some of my worries about
the epistemological status of narratives through an examination of
Tolstoy’s short novel The Kreutzer Sonata. I argue that, despite protesta-
tions to the contrary, the protagonist has not acquired greater self-
knowledge. He has changed the stories he tells about himself without
having understood his past or those around him any better. Then I
sketch what a genuine increase in self-knowledge and moral under-
standing might look like. For this I will rely on the discussion in
Spinoza’s Ethics. Spinoza is particularly useful for my purposes here
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because the moral transformation he describes includes greater self-
knowledge. I then briefly consider another short work by Tolstoy (his
late story “After the Ball”) for a concrete example of what genuine self-
knowledge and moral enlightenment might look like.
I
Pozdnyshev, the protagonist of The Kreutzer Sonata, relates the story of
his marriage to a fellow passenger over the course of a train journey.4
The climax of the story is Pozdnyshev’s murder of his wife in a jealous
rage after he has become convinced that she has been having an affair
with Trukhachevsky, a violinist. We never learn whether or not his
suspicions were justified. Interspersed with the narrative are Pozdnyshev’s
reconsidered views on marriage and human sexuality. These are
strikingly similar to Tolstoy’s own, expounded in a (to the best of my
knowledge un-translated) Afterword to the novel.5
Pozdnyshev claims to have greater self-knowledge than he did before
his crime. He says that while he was in jail for eleven months awaiting
trial, “I pondered over myself and my past and came to understand it”
(p. 368).6 He presents two parallel causal histories of an emotional life
dominated by anger, jealousy and spite, recounting events both as he
understood them at the time and as he has come to see them in his
newly “enlightened” state. At the time of the events he recounts,
Pozdnyshev attributed his negative emotions and the quarrels with his
wife either to trivialities—problems with the children, the household,
etc., or to his wife’s “difficult” character. As he tells his fellow traveler
these events, however, Pozdnyshev is able to identify what he now sees as
the true cause of his unhappy marriage; namely, that both he and his
wife were victims of the prevailing unhealthy and immoral attitude to
sexuality common to their social class and contemporaries. Pozdnyshev
elaborates, “The sex passion, in whatever form it is presented, is an evil,
a dreadful evil, which is to be combated and not encouraged as it is with
us” (p. 313). Yet there are good reasons to reject as spurious Pozdnyshev’s
claims of greater understanding and to suspect that he has merely
replaced one set of pretexts with another. This is particularly apparent
in his descriptions of his wife and attitudes towards her.
Here is one example of the “dual history” of emotions relayed in The
Kreutzer Sonata. Pozdnyshev tells his fellow passenger that
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vituperations were called forth by the coffee, the tablecloth, the carriage,
a move in a card game—things that could not possibly have held the
slightest importance either for her or for me. For myself I may say that at
times my hatred of her reached a fantastic pitch . . . . At that time I failed
to notice that my feelings of hate regularly and inevitably followed the
periods of what is called love. A period of love, a period of hate; a weak
period of love, a brief period of hate; an intense period of love, a
prolonged period of hate. We did not then realize that this love and hate
were different aspects of one and the same animal feeling. (p. 329)
By “animal feeling” Pozdnyshev has in mind what he has come to
regard as the unhealthy sensuality between him and his wife.
The text of The Kreutzer Sonata allows at least one alternative set of
reasons for Pozdnyshev’s inability to understand the cause of his
emotions during his marriage. Rather than a mistaken conception of
the nature of physical passion, Pozdnyshev’s ignorance of his own
emotional states and unhappy marriage could stem from a lack of self-
knowledge more generally. His anger could stem not from unhealthy
attitudes toward sexuality but from his frustration at his inability to
control his own desire, and at his inability, indeed the impossibility, of
controlling his wife’s body. This desire for control is manifest in the
instrumental character of his anger, and in the fact that Pozdnyshev
never sees his wife as a full human being: she is always an object to be
managed.
Tolstoy’s fiction contains many well-drawn and vivacious female
characters; Pozdnyshev’s wife is not among them. As we are told the
story through Pozdnyshev’s twisted psyche, such an incomplete portrait
is appropriate. It is significant that she is never named or fully
described, and hence never has full identity as a person in the account.
Pozdnyshev does not see her, neither before nor after her death, as a
human being with an identity and character separate from his own.
With very few exceptions—incidents where we do glimpse a portrait of
a more fully drawn character—she is presented as a body to be
controlled or as an animal to be restrained.
Early in his narrative Pozdnyshev claims to speak for all men when he
says, “What we want is the body” (p. 302). He makes an explicit
connection between society women (presumably including his wife)
and prostitutes (p. 303). The likening of his wife to a prostitute is
enhanced when Pozdnyshev claims that women who practice birth
control (again, presumably including his own wife) are prostitutes, and
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further describes a prostitute as, “one who has descended to the level
not of beasts, but of things” (p. 321). Pozdnyshev does not see his wife
as a human being then, but like a prostitute, as a thing. At one point
Pozdnyshev declares of his wife, “She is not a human being! She is a
bitch, a loathsome bitch [merzkaia suka]!” (p. 360). The likening of his
wife to an animal is even more explicit when he describes her as similar
to “a well-fed underexercised horse in full trappings that is suddenly
given the rein” (p. 332). Pozdnyshev is frank about his desire to control
his wife and his frustration that he cannot, saying: “There was no rein
on her at all, as there is no rein on ninety-nine percent of our women.
I realized this and was afraid” (p. 332).
There are numerous other indications that Pozdnyshev is disturbed
by his wife’s sexuality and her ability to control her body as she sees fit.
He says that there was, “something challenging, something disturbing”
about her beauty (p. 332). It is especially telling that Pozdnyshev is
convinced that a factor that was “directly responsible” for what was to
happen—that is, her death at his hands—is the fact that she began to
practice birth control after the birth of their fifth child (p. 331). He is
clearly disturbed and troubled by the possibility of his wife’s sexual
freedom.
What is perhaps Pozdnyshev’s deepest insight into his own motiva-
tion occurs on the train journey from the country back to Moscow
where he will surprise his wife having dinner with Trukhachevsky and
kill her: “The awful thing was that I claimed complete and unquestion-
able ownership of her body, as if it were my body, and at the same time
I realized I was unable to own her body, that it was not mine, and that
she could dispose of it in a way I did not want her to” (p. 357). His act
of murder can be seen as an ultimate act of control and domination.
Her body has given rise to his anger and frustration, and it is on her
body that his anger and revenge will be played out. It is deeply ironic
that Pozdnyshev dates the beginning of his moral conversion to the
third day after his wife’s death, when he sees her lifeless body in the
coffin. “Only when I saw her face in death did I realize what I had done”
(pp. 368–69). He finally sees her as a human being; yet at this point she
is not a human being but a lifeless corpse. She has gone from being an
object of sexual desire to being an object in the literal sense, a corpse.
It seems clear that Pozdnyshev’s outward actions—his temper tan-
trums and the eventual murder—are aimed at controlling his wife. But
I want to say something more: his anger facilitates these actions and is
a form of self-justification. Pozdnyshev does not get angry and strike out
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at his wife; rather, frustrated by his inability to control her, he wants to
strike her and so becomes angry, thereby allowing himself to commit an
act that at some level he must realize is wrong. The suggestion that
anger can be instrumental or directed toward a goal, and that emotion
is in some way subject to personal choice or acts of will might seem
paradoxical. Yet such a view of the emotions (which I cannot defend
here) has roots in Aristotle and the Stoics, and has been propounded
by existentialist thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre. More recently, Robert
Solomon has argued that emotions can be purposive or instrumental,
and Patricia Greenspan has defended the view that emotions can play a
role in rational choice.7
Pozdnyshev’s response to anger and other negative emotions falls
into three basic categories: the emotion controls him; self-control and
mastery of his actions despite the emotion he feels; and willing assent to
negative emotions. I argue that both Pozdnyshev’s assent to anger and
his suppression of it are best understood as manifestations of self-
control. Pozdnyshev is described as being at the mercy of his anger
surprisingly few times. The most important incident is on the train
journey just before the murder, when he is unable to stop his imagina-
tion from conjuring up images of his wife’s infidelity and depravity (pp.
355–58). Here Pozdnyshev’s anger serves to enhance his motivation for
murder. If he were to imagine his wife as a loving mother, he would be
unlikely to summon the resolution necessary to kill her.
At other times Pozdnyshev feels anger welling up inside him but is
able to suppress it; that is, he controls his outward actions so as not to
betray his inner rage. This reaction is most clearly evident in his
relations with Trukhachevsky. Pozdnyshev is careful not to let his
feelings of anger and jealousy show: “I was particularly attentive as I saw
him out (how else is one to see out the man who has come to destroy
the peace and happiness of one’s home!) With particular warmth I
pressed his soft white hand” (p. 344). Pozdnyshev’s self-control comes
from his desire to preserve his self-image and his attention to social
propriety. It would not be socially acceptable to behave in a discourte-
ous manner, so he does not. But the anger itself is an implicit judgment
of Trukhachevsky, and hence of his wife as well. Trukhachevsky only
represents a threat if Pozdnyshev is suspicious of his wife’s virtue. Again,
his assessment of her as morally suspect will make it easier for him to
rationalize and commit murder.
The third and most interesting of Pozdnyshev’s reactions to anger is
a willing assent to fury, accompanied by intense self-consciousness. In
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these cases, he is described as making a conscious choice to surrender
to his anger. Such surrender is apparent in Pozdnyshev’s description of
what will be the final fight with his wife before the night of her murder:
“Suddenly I was seized by hatred such as I had never felt before, and for
the first time I longed to give physical expression to my hatred. I leaped
up and made for her, but I remember that just as I leaped up I became
aware of what I was doing and asked myself if it was right to give way to
my feelings, and answered that it was, because in that way I would
frighten her. And so instead of suppressing my hatred I surrendered
myself to it and rejoiced to feel it running riot within me” (p. 346).
Similarly, Pozdnyshev remembers that during the murder, “I realized
everything, and not for a moment did I stop realizing it. The more the
steam that my fury generated, the brighter the glow of my conscious-
ness, so that I could not possibly have failed to perceive everything I
did” (p. 364).
The third type of reaction to anger—willing assent—is most clearly
instrumental, and Pozdnyshev’s description of the murder scene is
particularly telling. We are given indications that he has already
decided that he will kill his wife to punish her for infidelity, real or
imagined. He has built up to this point with every angry act and
thought. When the final confrontation comes, Pozdnyshev actually
luxuriates in his anger, almost savouring it as he finally revenges himself
on his wife. His anger facilitates his deeds; a dispassionate murder
would be inconsistent with Pozdnyshev’s sense of frustration. Here,
anger allows him to indulge his wounded pride with appropriate
brutality.
Pozdnyshev has rewritten the emotional history of his life and
marriage, and has thereby altered his self-image. At the time of the
train journey he sees himself as morally enlightened (especially as to
the true nature of physical passion), and as having acquired greater
wisdom and self-knowledge. But has Pozdnyshev really changed? All the
information we have is contained in his narratives. A close examination
of the text shows that his claims to greater knowledge are at best
problematic. Arguably, he has far to go before we can accept his claims
of greater understanding and insight. Narrative alone cannot provide
the answers; we need more information before we can come to a better
understanding of Pozdnyshev. We need to know something about his
behaviour, specifically his response to frustration, the extent of his
ability to control anger, and his treatment of women.
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II
The attempt to understand another individual and to determine the
extent of her self-understanding may be informed by narrative, but
cannot be limited to narrative. I would like to examine one attempt to
describe the effects of a genuine increase in self-knowledge and moral
understanding.
Part of Spinoza’s project in the Ethics is to describe an intellectual or
moral conversion whereby the individual attains self-mastery and is less
subject to the tyranny of negative emotions. A major aspect of this
process is the development of reflexive knowledge. Each person has the
power to examine critically his or her mental states, come to rational
conclusions about them, and suffer less because of them. The more self-
knowledge an individual has, the better he or she is able to discern
clearly and distinctly the reasons and causes for particular mental states,
and the greater will be the capacity for self-determined action.8
The individual who has gone through such a conversion and is
largely self-determined (the “free man” as Spinoza calls him) strives, “to
conceive things as they are in themselves.”9 Part of what Spinoza means
here is that in order to understand emotional situations we must
attempt to view them from a more objective point of view than the
perspective of our own interests and desires. This will in turn have an
effect on how we view others. The individual who is reasonable and self-
determined strives to see both himself and others “in the light of
eternity.”10 That is, she strives to understand events as God might.
How do we know when an individual has acquired more or less
adequate knowledge about his mental states? Spinoza indicates that
someone who has achieved self-mastery will behave in certain ways.11
First, he will be neither ascetic nor hedonistic but will enjoy pleasures
(cuisine, athletics, the arts) in moderation. In dealings with others he
will not be vengeful but will attempt to repay hatred or anger with love.
He will help others not out of pity, hope or fear, but because it is the
right thing to do. Internally he will feel self-contentment and be
untroubled by hopes or fears, as these emotions indicate lack of
knowledge and weakness of mind.
A caveat: I am not sure that we can expect to have definitive answers
regarding another’s moral and intellectual transformations. Spinoza
allows that certain types of self-deception and inadequate knowledge
may provoke behavior similar to that of a morally enlightened indi-
vidual. For example someone who held what Spinoza would regard as
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religious superstitions might behave just as charitably as someone who
had truly acquired virtue.12 For the purposes of my discussion it is
enough that the individual who has acquired self-understanding will
refrain from certain types of actions.
According to Spinoza, then, genuine moral development and self-
knowledge will have an effect on how one sees and behaves towards
others. It is in these areas that we must look to test claims of greater
insight and self-knowledge. How does Pozdnyshev fare according to
these lights? There are many reasons to think that he has not attained
the status of a Spinozistic free man. As I have argued, his claims to
moral enlightenment are not to be taken at face value. There is little
indication that Pozdnyshev has come to an objective view of the events
he recounts. He continues to see himself and his dead wife as having
been victims of forces beyond their control. His behavior on the train
where he tells his story is not that of a man at peace with himself. The
narrator describes him as “nervous” with darting eyes, and painstak-
ingly avoiding all talk and contact with other passengers (p. 285).
In order to illustrate how one of Spinoza’s free men might comport
himself and act toward others, let us look at another of Tolstoy’s
protagonists, Ivan Vasilyevich of “After the Ball.” The structure of “After
the Ball” is quite similar to that of The Kreutzer Sonata. In both
protagonists relate past events to an anonymous narrator. But while the
often agitated Pozdnyshev speaks to a stranger on a train journey,
Vasilyevich is surrounded by a group of intimates—the narrator refers
to him as “our respected friend”—and is said to speak “with great fervor
and sincerity” (p. 370). Vasilyevich does not make the same explicit
claims to greater knowledge that Pozdnyshev does, but he is convinced
that the incidents he relates have changed him: “My whole life was
changed by a single night, or rather, a morning” (p. 370).
Vasilyevich tells his friends of a night, long ago in his youth, when he
attended a ball and danced with the girl he loved. He remembers being
especially touched by the sight of the girl dancing with her aged father.
Later the next morning after the ball he sees the father, an army officer,
supervising the cruel and violent punishment of a Tatar deserter.
Vasilyevich is tormented by the scene and unable to get it out of his
mind. His confusion and distress causes him to become a “good for
nothing” (“ia nikuda ne godilsia”)—he changes his plan to join the
army and his love for the girl evaporates. Yet we are given indications
that his self-described status as “good for nothing” is not correct. One of
the assembled listeners protests, “It would be more to the point to say
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how many people would have turned out to be good-for-nothing had it
not been for you” (pp. 379–80).
Vasilyevich never blames anyone else for his lack of material success,
nor does the conduct of her father cause him to lose respect for the girl
he once loved. Overall, the tone of his reminiscences is strikingly
different from that of Pozdnyshev’s. While there are numerous indica-
tions in The Kreutzer Sonata that Pozdnyshev has not transcended the
very views on sexuality and women that he so vehemently decries,
Vasilyevich’s recognition of the horror of corporal punishment is meant
to be seen as an instance of genuine understanding and increased self-
knowledge. We can see this in the manner in which each man tells his
story: Vasilyevich is calm and surrounded by friends. Pozdnyshev is
socially isolated, nervous, quick to anger, and seems unstable. Vasilyevich
seems to have made concrete changes in his life, beginning with his
decision not to enter the army. Pozdnyshev is still riding the train.
I have illustrated my worries about the epistemological status of
personal narratives through an examination of two fictional narratives
by one great writer. There are several reasons why I think this a fruitful
strategy. Genuine personal narratives usually lack the coherence and
elegance of those recounted in literary fiction. Indeed, I think we are
rightly suspicious of personal narratives that seem too polished and
practiced. We expect a certain amount of inarticulateness and clumsi-
ness in the authentic accounts of ordinary people. Moreover in a
genuine personal narrative as much may be conveyed by gestures, tones
of voice, and lapsed silence as is by words. While the text of a literary
narrative does not change with repeated reading, personal narratives
can be more or less elaborated or expurgated depending on who is
being addressed. Even the stories told only for our own benefit can
change with time and circumstances. When we change the stories we
tell, we reflect a different understanding of the events described, or, at
least, we are putting a different construction on them. To find out
whether this “different” understanding is also better, we need to look
beyond narrative to actions, being in the world, and the treatment of
others.
University of Ottawa, Canada
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